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Abstract. The presence of contextuality in quantum theory was first highlighted by Bell, Kochen and
Specker, who discovered that for quantum systems of three or more dimensions, measurements could not
be viewed as deterministically revealing pre-existing properties of the system. More precisely, no model can
assign deterministic outcomes to the projectors of a quantum measurement in a way that depends only on the
projector and not the context (the full set of projectors) in which it appeared, despite the fact that the Born
rule probabilities associated with projectors are independent of the context. A more general, operational
definition of contextuality introduced by Spekkens, which we will term “probabilistic contextuality”, drops
the assumption of determinism and allows for operations other than measurements to be considered
contextual. Even two-dimensional quantum mechanics can be shown to be contextual under this generalised
notion. Probabilistic noncontextuality represents the postulate that elements of an operational theory that
cannot be distinguished from each other based on the statistics of arbitrarily many repeated experiments
(they give rise to the same operational probabilities) are ontologically identical. In this paper, we introduce
a framework that enables us to distinguish between different noncontextuality assumptions in terms of the
relationships between the ontological representations of objects in the theory given a certain relation between
their operational representations. This framework can be used to motivate and define a “possibilistic”
analogue, encapsulating the idea that elements of an operational theory that cannot be unambiguously
distinguished operationally can also not be unambiguously distinguished ontologically. We then prove that
possibilistic noncontextuality is equivalent to an alternative notion of noncontextuality proposed by Hardy.
Finally, we demonstrate that these weaker noncontextuality assumptions are sufficient to prove alternative
versions of known “no-go” theorems that constrain ψ-epistemic models for quantum mechanics.
Page 1 of 14 AUTHOR SUBMITTED MANUSCRIPT - NJP-106017.R1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60 Ac
ce
p
d M
an
us
cri
pt
1. Introduction
One way in which quantum mechanics differs strongly from classical mechanics is the existence of
incompatible observables; if we want to think that measurements reveal properties of a system, then we
must reconcile this with the fact that there exist pairs of properties that cannot be simultaneously measured.
By considering the same observables appearing in different contexts, that is, measured alongside different
sets of other observables, Bell [1], as well as Kochen and Specker [2] showed that measurements could not
be thought of as simply revealing underlying properties of the system in a way that was independent of the
context in which the observable was measured. This property of quantum mechanics is now referred to as
contextuality.
Discussions of contextuality often focus on scenarios in which an element of a operational theory such as
quantum mechanics manifests itself in two different contexts, such as two different decompositions of a density
matrix; or an observable being measured in two different ways, alongside different sets of co-measurable
observables. These manifestations are treated identically by the operational theory, always leading to the
same probabilities. In fact, this is why the same notation is used for the objects in the first place, as a context-
independent symbol is all that is needed to calculate probabilities. However there is no formal argument
to be made that these elements which are operationally context-independent should also be ontologically
context-independent: this must be taken axiomatically. Motivation for such an axiom cannot be logically
deduced or extrapolated from experimental data, but rather must be based on aesthetic principles (e.g.,
Leibniz’s principle [3]). We call such axioms “noncontextuality assumptions”. This idea, that operationally
indistinguishable objects should also be considered ontologically identical is a form of noncontextuality,
henceforth referred to as “probabilistic contextuality”. We see that it somewhat encapsulates the hypothesis,
reminiscent of Occam’s razor, that these objects give rise to identical properties because they are ontologically
identical. We will introduce a framework which allows us to compare and contrast different noncontextuality
axioms by viewing them as assumptions about ontological properties motivated by operational data.
This framework can be used to motivate and define a “possibilistic” analogue to probabilistic
noncontextuality. Possibilistic noncontextuality reflects the assumption that two elements of a physical
theory share the same operational possibilities also share the same ontological possibilities. The notion of
grouping states by the sets of events that they assign nonzero probability is not entirely novel: this viewpoint
emerges naturally in the setting of classical and quantum probability theory from considerations of what it
means for different parties to hold different but compatible beliefs about a system such as those of Brun,
Finkelstein and Mermin [4] or Caves, Fuchs and Schack [5]. This notion of possibilistic noncontextuality
is strictly weaker than that of probabilistic contextuality. We will demonstrate that analogues of some
results originally proved using the stronger notion of probabilistic noncontextuality in fact hold with this
weaker assumption: for example, it was shown by Spekkens [6] that the assumption of noncontextuality
for preparations is incompatible with the operational predictions of quantum mechanics, and it was
shown by Morris [7] and by Chen and Montina [8] that any ontological model obeying noncontextuality for
measurements must be ψ-ontic. We demonstrate that similar results can be proven using only the weaker,
possibilistic, notion of noncontextuality.
2. Notions of Noncontextuality
Noncontextuality is a property of an ontological model (also known as a hidden variable model). In order to
formulate a generalized notion of contextuality, we begin by briefly reviewing the framework of ontological
models, which allow for realistic descriptions of experimental procedures within an operational theory [6, 9].
2.1. Ontological models and operational theories
An operational theory assigns probabilities Pr(k|P, T ,M) to outcomes k occurring when procedures for a
preparation P, a transformation T , and finally a measurement M are implemented. Any particular P,
M or T will be denoted an element of the operational theory. Quantum mechanics can be regarded as
an operational theory by identifying preparation procedures with density matrices ρ, transformations with
2
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unitary operators U acting on density matrices via conjugation, and K-outcome measurements with positive-
operator-valued measures (POVM)M = {E1, . . . EK}. The probability for an outcome k given a preparation
described by ρ and a transformation by U is then given by the Born rule,
Pr(k|ρ, U,M) = tr[EkUρU
†]. (1)
An ontological model for such an operational theory consists of a set Λ, equipped with a σ-algebra Σ,
of possible ontic (or “real”) states alongside ontological representations of preparations, transformations and
measurements, dependent on each other only via states λ ∈ Λ. A preparation procedure P is represented
within the ontological model by the preparation of a system in an ontic state λ sampled according to some
measure µP on Λ. A transformation T in the operational theory is represented in the ontological model by
a map that, for a system in the ontic state λ, samples a new λ′ ∈ Λ according to the conditional probability
measure ΓT (λ
′|λ) on Λ. Finally, a K-outcome measurement M in the operational theory is represented in
the ontological model by a response function ξ such that, for a system in the ontic state λ, the measurement
outcome k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} =: NK is sampled from the conditional probability distribution {ξM(k|λ)} on NK .
The ontological model reproduces the predictions of the operational theory if
Pr(k|P, T ,M) =
∫
dλ dλ′ µP(λ)ΓT (λ
′|λ)ξM(k|λ
′) (2)
for all k,P, T ,M. While all constructions in this paper hold for general operational theories, we will only
explicitly consider ontological models of quantum mechanics. For brevity, we will omit transformations and
focus solely on preparations and measurements, though all definitions can be directly extended to account
for transformations.
The Beltrametti-Bugajski model [10] is perhaps the simplest example of an ontological model of pure-
state quantum mechanics. In it, pure quantum states are treated as being physical states, so we have Λ = H;
µ|ψ〉(|λ〉) = δ|ψ〉(|λ〉); and ξM (E||λ〉) = tr(E|λ〉〈λ|).
We note that for the rest of this paper we will be assuming that our ontological models have a convex
structure and therefore preparations (or other operational procedures) can be statistically mixed with each
other. Without this assumption many of these noncontextuality relations become trivial. An example of a
model without such an assumption is quantum mechanics restricted to pure states, unitary transformations,
and projective measurements.
2.2. Operational and ontological relations
In this section, we define a generalized noncontextuality assumption to be an assumption that a particular
relation at the level of the operational theory implies a (usually similar) relation at the level of the ontological
theory. It is a scheme for making conclusions about ontology based on a theory’s operational predictions. A
noncontextuality assumption allows reasoning about ontological properties based on observable (operational)
phenomena.
More formally, an operational relation ∼ will be a symmetric, reflexive relation over elements in the
operational theory (i.e., preparations, transformations and/or measurements); an ontological relation ≈ is
a symmetric, reflexive relation over elements of the ontological model. For clarity, ∼ and ≈ will always be
used to denote operational and ontological relations respectively.
Definition 1 (Noncontextuality Assumption) A noncontextuality assumption is a statement that when
two objects in the operational theory are related by a specified operational relation ∼, their ontological
representations must be related by an ontological relation ≈. For example, applied to preparations these
are statements of the form
P1 ∼ P2 ⇒ µP1 ≈ µP2 (3)
Notably, we do not require that an operational or ontological relation be transitive by definition, and
therefore do not restrict ourselves to only consider equivalence relations for this purpose. In practice, however,
many interesting noncontextuality assumptions are defined using equivalence relations and elements related
by such will be referred to as equivalent.
3
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In general, the operational relation is a condition that specifies which elements of the operational theory
are related to each other. The noncontextuality assumption and ontological relation then state how the
ontic representation of two equivalent elements of the operational theory are related to each other. Given
a noncontextuality assumption X, we say that an operational theory exhibits X contextuality if in any
ontological model that correctly reproduces the operational theory there exists some pair of operational
elements related by
X
∼ whose ontological representations are not related by
X
≈.
While noncontextuality assumptions can apply to preparations, transformations and measurements, in
this section we will use preparations as an example.
2.3. Probabilistic Noncontextuality
As discussed, in quantum mechanics there are many elements such as density matrices, observables, and
POVM elements, whose operational behaviour is context-independent. The notion of contextuality due to
Spekkens [6] captures this tension by making the assumption that objects that are operationally identical
are also ontologically identical. We will present this form of noncontextuality assumption using our notation
here.
Definition 2 (ProbOp) Two preparation procedures P1 and P2 in an operational model are probabilistically
equivalent (denoted P1
Prob
∼ P2) if for all outcomes k of all measurement procedures M,
Pr(k|P1,M) = Pr(k|P2,M). (4)
In the case of quantum mechanics, all operational predictions for a preparation procedure P are
completely encoded in the associated density matrix ρP . Therefore we have
P1
Prob
∼ P2 ⇔ ρP1 = ρP1 . (5)
As a particular example, the maximally mixed state can be prepared in many ways, such as by tracing over
half of a maximally-entangled pair, randomly applying a unitary operation or by preparing a system in a
basis and forgetting which element was prepared. All of these methods are probabilistically equivalent for a
single qubit.
Having specified an operational relation, the next step is to specify an ontological relation.
Definition 3 (ProbOn) Two preparation distributions µP1 , µP2 in an ontological model are probabilisti-
cally equivalent, denoted µP1
Prob
≈ µP2 , if and only if µP1(λ) = µP2(λ) ∀λ.
Definition 4 (Probabilistic Noncontextuality) For any two preparations P1,P2 related by ProbOp,
their ontological representations µP1 , µP2 are related by ProbOn. That is, the probabilistic noncontextuality
assumption states that
P1
Prob
∼ P2 ⇒ µP1
Prob
≈ µP2 . (6)
In the quantum case, this translates to assuming
µP = µρP . (7)
So, in a probabilistically noncontextual model, if there are two preparation procedures that cannot be
statistically distinguished by any measurements then those preparations lead to identical physical situations.
In a probabilistically contextual model, then there are different physical situations that nonetheless lead to
identical operational predictions for any measurement: the inability to distinguish them is caused by lack of
sufficiently fine-grained measurement.
We can look to electromagnetism in order to find a classical example of an application of this principle.
Na¨ıvely, one might expect an operational preparation of an electromagnetic system to correspond to a
specific magnetic vector potential as an ontic state. However, different vector potentials correspond to the
same experimental predictions if they differ by a curl-free vector field. The application of the probabilistic
noncontextuality assumption, then, would be to say that all such preparations are really ontologically
identical; they result in the same distribution over ontic states. The vector potential is often said to be
4
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unphysical because of the property that different potentials lead to identical experimental predictions; this
line of argument would lead one to conclude that not only are such distributions over ontic states identical,
but that they are a delta function. That is, we quotient the state space to form a new ontic state Λ˜ = Λ/∼,
where A ∼ A′ if and only if ∇(A−A′) = 0. This will ensure that any such pair of ontic states have the same
representative in Λ˜. The assumptions leading to such an ontological refinement are thus strictly stronger
than those leading only to probabilistic noncontextuality.
We see that both the operational relation ProbOp and the ontological relation ProbOn are probabilistic
in that they depend on the full set of (exact) probabilities associated with the object. These probabilistic
relations are very restrictive and as a result,
Prob
∼ is a very selective relation, leading to a restriction on
ontological models that is more easily satisfied than that of a less selective relation. However, those elements
that are related have a very strong ontological condition applied by ProbOn.
Contextuality is often considered to be a generalisation of nonlocality; by Fine’s theorem [11], the
factorisability condition that characterises local distributions in a Bell scenario is interchangeable with the
assumption of outcome-determinism for ontological models. With this assumption, nonlocality manifests
itself as noncontextuality with respect to contexts chosen jointly by a spacelike separated Alice and Bob.
Some notions of contextuality, such as that of Kochen and Specker[2]; Klyachko, Can, Cetiner, Bincioglu
and Shumovsky [12]; Abramsky and Brandenburger [13]; and Ac´ın, Fritz, Leverrier and Bele´n Sainz [14]
assume these deterministic models for their notions of contextuality. Probabilistic noncontextuality is a
step more general, not necessarily assuming determinism, but recovering these notions of noncontextuality
when we restrict our gaze to outcome-deterministic ontological models. It can be considered a generalised
form of the type of nonlocality identified by Bell; a scenario demonstrates probabilistic contextuality if its
precise operational probabilities cannot be fully explained by a noncontextual (rather than nonlocal) model.
As such, under certain assumptions, probabilistic noncontextuality can be detected by inequalities that are
robust to noise, as an analogue of Bell inequalities [12, 15].
2.4. Possibilistic Noncontextuality
Another natural choice for both the operational and ontological relations is a possibilistic one, in which we
consider only the possibilities of operational and ontological events, rather than their probabilities. Such
possibilistic considerations also appear naturally in the setting of consistency conditions for agents beliefs
about the state of a system, which have been previously studied in the literature. In the work of Brun,
Finkelstein and Mermin (BFM) [4], a consistent set of state assignments is a set of density matrices which
have some overlap in their operational possibilities. The different parties can assign different density matrices
to a system, but as long as there exist some states in the mutual support of all of them, then there is an
event that can occur that all of them agree is possible, meaning that their initial state assignments are
consistent. In that of Caves, Fuchs and Schack (CFS) [5], the strongest compatibility criterion that can be
applied is to ask whether or not the density matrices assigned to the state by each of the parties are in the
same equivalence class, defined in this possibilistic sense. If they are, then all of them agree on which events
are possible and impossible, even if they disagree on the precise probabilities to assign to each event. Both
of these conditions are naturally possibilistic rather than probabilistic.
Such considerations motivate us to define possibilistic operational and ontological relations.
Definition 5 (PossOp) Two preparation procedures P1 and P2 in an operational theory are possibilistically
equivalent, denoted P1
Poss
∼ P2, if for all outcomes k of all measurement procedures M,
Pr(k|P1,M) = 0⇔ Pr(k|P2,M) = 0. (8)
In the quantum case, two preparation procedures P1 and P2 are possibilistically equivalent if and only if
the density matrices they give rise to have the same kernel (or equivalently, the same support). The kernel,
which is spanned by the states with which ρ has no overlap, completely defines the possibilistic structure of
measurements.
P1
Poss
∼ P2 ⇔ ker ρP1 = ker ρP2 (9)
where kerM = {v :Mv = 0} is the kernel of M .
5
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Definition 6 (Support) The support of a measure µ is the largest set S(µ) such that every open set which
has non-empty intersection with S(µ) has nonzero measure.
More succinctly, but a little less accurately, the support S(µ) = {λ : µ(λ) > 0}.
Definition 7 (PossOn) Two preparation distributions µP1 , µP2 in an ontological model are possibilistically
equivalent, denoted µP1
Poss
≈ µP2 , if S(µP1) = S(µP2).
Definition 8 (Possibilistic Noncontextuality) For any two preparations P1,P2 related by PossOp,
their ontological representations µP1 , µP2 are related by PossOn. That is,
P2
Poss
∼ P2 ⇒ µP1
Poss
≈ µP2 . (10)
In the quantum case, this translates to assuming
ker ρP1 = ker ρP2 ⇒ µP1
Poss
≈ µP2 . (11)
A fully possibilistic noncontextuality assumption, then, would be that if two preparation procedures
are possibilistically equivalent operationally, then their ontological representations are also possibilistically
equivalent.
A possibilistically noncontextual model for quantum mechanics would provide a natural explanation for
why there exist different preparation procedures that cannot be unambiguously discriminated [16]; such
preparations lead to ensembles of ontic states that themselves cannot be unambiguously distinguished.
Therefore, the lack of the ability to perform unambiguous discrimination in a theory could be interpreted as
property of the distributions over ontic states themselves, rather than emerging from a lack of sufficiently
fine-grained measurements.
Additionally, we find that the assumption of possibilistic preparation noncontextuality causes the
quantum consistency conditions, mentioned above, for density matrix assignment to coincide with classical
notions of consistency of beliefs. If we have a collection of agents, each can describe their subjective beliefs
about the state of a quantum system via a density matrix ρi. According to the BFM consistency criterion,
these assignments are consistent if the intersection of the supports of the ρi is empty; that is, that there
is some subspace of the Hilbert space which each party agrees is in the support of their density matrix.
Since the assumption of possibilistic noncontextuality for preparations uniquely defines a set of ontic states
associated with this agreed support, this quantum compatibility condition reduces exactly to the classical
notion of “strong consistency”, which is that there exists some physical state that each agent agrees could
represent the true state of the system. The strongest compatibility condition considered by Caves, Fuchs,
and Schack, which they denote equal supports, is that the supports of each of the ρi are identical; in the same
way as above, the assumption of possibilistic preparation noncontextuality means this condition reduces to
the classical concept of concordance: that the agents agree on which states are possible and impossible,
although their actual probability assignments may differ.
2.5. Hardy Noncontextuality
We can now bring other previously-studied notions of noncontextuality within this framework. One such
notion is known as “Hardy” or “logical” noncontextuality [13, 17, 18], and when applied to preparations
corresponds to the assumption that two preparations leading to identical operational predictions must be
compatible with the same set of ontic states. As with probabilistic noncontextuality, Hardy noncontextuality
has been considered previously under the assumption of outcome determinism, such as in the treatment
of Abramsky et al. Again, we study a more general notion without this restriction. While probabilistic
noncontextuality can be considered a generalisation of Bell nonlocality, Hardy noncontextuality can
be considered a generalisation of Hardy’s proof of nonlocality. That is, a scenario exhibits Hardy
noncontextuality if there are possibilities (rather than detailed probabilities) that cannot be explained within
a noncontextual ontological model.
We can formulate Hardy noncontextuality using the operational and ontological relations defined above.
Definition 9 (HardyNC) An ontological model is Hardy noncontextual iff P1
Prob
∼ P2 ⇒ µP1
Poss
≈ µP2 .
6
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Figure 1. A square showing the different types of contextuality assumptions, under the assumption
of convexity. If convexity is not demanded, there are multiple theories that fulfil the stronger form of
noncontextuality indicated as a contradiction above, such as quantum mechanics restricted to pure states
and unitary operations.
The assumption of Hardy noncontextuality is strictly weaker than probabilistic noncontextuality as it
uses the same operational relation but imposes a weaker ontological relation on the identified elements.
Furthermore, Hardy noncontextuality is directly implied by possibilistic noncontextuality because
P1
Prob
∼ P2 ⇒ P1
Poss
∼ P2. (12)
Intuitively, the assumption of Hardy noncontextuality appears to also be strictly weaker than of
possibilistic noncontextuality because the same ontological relation is being enforced in both cases, while
possibilistic noncontextuality has a operational relation that is easier to satisfy and so relates more elements of
the theory. For example, all density matrices of the form p|0〉〈0|+(1−p)|1〉〈1| for p ∈ (0, 1) are possibilistically
equivalent and yet no two such density matrices are probabilistically equivalent.
We now prove, however, that Hardy noncontextuality and possibilistic noncontextuality are equivalent
for ontological models of quantum mechanics. Before doing this, we note that any two preparation procedures
that result in the same density matrix being prepared must have the same ontic supports under an assumption
of possibilistic, probabilistic, or Hardy noncontextuality. Hence, we will use the notation S(µρ) ≡ S(µP) for
any P that results in a preparation of ρ.
Theorem 1 An ontological model of finite-dimensional quantum mechanics is possibilistically noncontextual
if and only if it is Hardy noncontextual.
Proof. We will present the proof for preparation procedures here and defer the proofs for transformations
and measurements to the appendix. From eq. (12), possibilistic preparation noncontextuality implies Hardy
preparation noncontextuality: any elements related under the probabilistic operational relation are also
related under the possibilistic operational relation. So, we only need to prove the converse, that is, that Hardy
noncontextuality implies that density matrices with the same kernel can be represented by distributions with
the same support over Λ.
Let ρ0 and ρ1 be density matrices with the same kernel and with smallest nonzero and largest eigenvalues
αj,min and αj,max for j = 0, 1 respectively. We define
σ0 =
1
1− α0,minα1,max
(
ρ0 −
α0,min
α1,max
ρ1
)
. (13)
7
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We see that σ0 is positive semi-definite, as the largest eigenvalue of
α0,min
α1,max
ρ1 is α0,min and ρ0 and ρ1 have
the same kernel. We note that we must have that α0,min ≤ α1,max, since they have support on subspaces
of equal dimensions, say, d, and so both ρ1 and ρ0 have d nonzero eigenvalues that sum to 1. Hence, we
have α0,min = α1,max only in the case that each is the completely mixed state over their support, and
α0,min < α1,max otherwise. It is easily verified that tr(σ0) = 1, so σ0 is a density matrix.
Hence ρ0 can be prepared as a convex mixture of ρ1 and σ0 as
ρ0 =
(
1−
α0,min
α1,max
)
σ0 +
α0,min
α1,max
ρ1. (14)
Therefore there exists a preparation procedure that prepares ρ0 such that
S(µρ0) = S(µσ0) ∪ S(µρ1) ⊇ S(µρ1) (15)
We can then repeat the argument for ρ1. Therefore S(µρ0) = S(µρ1) for any ρ0, ρ1 with the same kernel,
completing the proof.
One immediate consequence of this is that it permits the more natural motivation of possibilistic
noncontextuality to be applied to the better-known concept of Hardy noncontextuality, providing a
motivation for its assumption independent of the fact that it is a weaker noncontextuality assumption than
is than probabilistic noncontextuality.
3. Restrictions on ontological models due to possibilistic noncontextuality
The assumption of probabilistic preparation noncontextuality is incompatible with the operational
predictions of quantum theory [6]. We now show that even the seemingly weaker notion of possibilistic
noncontextuality is already incompatible with quantum theory.
Theorem 2 Any ontological model of quantum mechanics is possibilistically contextual for preparations.
Proof. Let
|φ〉 = cos
(
φ
2
)
|0〉+ sin
(
φ
2
)
|1〉 (16)
for some 0 < φ < π/2. We note that all mixed states are related under the possibilistic operational relation.
In particular then, a mixed state made up of |φ〉〈φ| and |−π/2〉〈−π/2|, and one made up of |−φ〉〈−φ| and
|π/2〉〈π/2| are related. Therefore, such matrices must have the same support.
S(|−φ〉〈−φ|) ∪ S
(∣∣∣π
2
〉〈π
2
∣∣∣) = S(|φ〉〈φ|) ∪ S (
∣∣∣−π
2
〉〈
−
π
2
∣∣∣) . (17)
Taking the intersection of both sides with S(
∣∣π
2
〉〈
π
2
∣∣) gives
S
(∣∣∣π
2
〉〈π
2
∣∣∣) = [S(|φ〉〈φ|) ∩ S (
∣∣∣π
2
〉〈π
2
∣∣∣)] ∪ [S (
∣∣∣−π
2
〉〈
−
π
2
∣∣∣) ∩ S (
∣∣∣π
2
〉〈π
2
∣∣∣)] (18)
=
[
S(|φ〉〈φ|) ∩ S
(∣∣∣π
2
〉〈π
2
∣∣∣)] (19)
⊆ S(|φ〉〈φ|) (20)
where the second line follows since
∣∣π
2
〉
and
∣∣−π2 〉 are completely operationally distinguishable, and hence
must be fully ontologically distinct. This shows that the set of states consistent with |π/2〉〈π/2| is a
subset of those consistent with |φ〉〈φ|, and so any operational predictions compatible with a preparation
of |π/2〉〈π/2|must also be consistent with a preparation of |φ〉〈φ|. However, in order to be consistent with
quantum mechanics, preparing
∣∣π
2
〉
and measuring in the basis {|φ〉, |π + φ〉} must give the outcome |π + φ〉
with nonzero probability.
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|−φ〉
|pi + φ〉
|pi/2〉
|φ〉
|−pi/2〉
Figure 2. Diagrams showing states that can be used in the proof of theorem 2.
The above proof is similar to Hardy’s proof of Bell’s theorem based only upon possibilistic
arguments [19]. In some sense, considering these possibilistic restrictions on ontological models is forcing
them to obey the same logical structure as the operational theory, in this case quantum mechanics. This is
because we can think of working with possibilities as a generalised probability model, in which we work with
the Boolean (logical) semiring in which an event is only prescribed the symbol 0 (impossible) or 1 (possible).
Another known restriction on ontological models under the assumption of probabilistic measurement
noncontextuality is that such models cannot be ψ-epistemic, a result first shown by Morris [7] and by Chen
and Montina [8]. Here, we will show an analogous result, in which we use a strictly weaker assumption than
probabilistic measurement noncontextuality.
We define two sets associated with a response function for outcome k of a measurement M in an
ontological model:
R[ξM (k|λ)] := {λ : ξM(k|λ) = 1} (21)
T [ξM (k|λ)] := {λ : ξM(k|λ) > 0}. (22)
We will show that any ontological model in which these sets depend only upon the POVM element Ek
associated with outcome k, and so can be denoted by R(Ek) and T (Ek) respectively, imposes restrictions
on which states can have ontic overlap. We will call such a model faithful, as it is a stronger form
of the faithfulness condition introduced in [20]. We note that this condition is implied by probabilistic
noncontextuality.
Theorem 3 Let |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 be two states in a Hilbert space of dimension d ≥ 2
N , with |〈ψ1|ψ2〉|
2 ≤
cos2N (2 tan−1(21/2N − 1)). Then in any faithful ontological model they have disjoint supports:
S(µ|ψ1〉) ∩ S(µ|ψ2〉) = ∅. (23)
Proof. Let P1 and P2 be fixed preparation procedures for |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 and let |ψ1〉 = |a〉
⊗N
and |ψ2〉 = |b〉
⊗N
where |a〉 = |φ〉 and |b〉 = |−φ〉 from eq. (16). This form for our states can be made without loss of generality,
since for any pair of states |ϕ1〉, |ϕ2〉 , there exists a unitary rotation mapping them into a pair of states
of our chosen form, and unitary actions must preserve overlaps of support. If |〈ϕ1|ϕ2〉|
2
= |〈ψ1|ψ2〉|
2
, then
there exists a unitary U such that U |ϕ1〉 = |ψ1〉 and U |ϕ2〉 = |ψ2〉, and so any state that is in the support of
|ϕ1〉 and |ϕ2〉 is mapped by such a transformation into a state that is in the support of |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 since
this is a legitimate preparation procedure for those states.
9
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By considering each of the measurements formed by independently measuring {|a〉, |a¯〉} or {|b〉,
∣∣b¯〉} on
each of the N qubits (where |a¯〉 denotes the orthogonal state to |a〉, and similarly for |b〉), we have
S(µ|ψ1〉) ∩ S(µ|ψ2〉) ⊆ ∩~ν∈{a,b}NR(|~ν〉〈~ν|), (24)
except perhaps on an unphysical set of measure 0, as either |a〉⊗N or |b〉⊗N is orthogonal to all but one
outcome in each measurement. To see this, consider the case in which we measure with respect to {|a〉, |a¯〉}
on the first qubit, and {|b〉,
∣∣b¯〉} on the second. Here, |a〉|a〉 is incompatible with |a¯〉|b〉 and |a¯〉∣∣b¯〉, with
a similar condition holding for |b〉|b〉. The only outcome that is compatible with both |a〉|a〉 and |b〉|b〉 is
|a〉|b〉. We note that by assumption, we have |〈a|b〉|2 ≤ cos2(2 tan−1(21/2N − 1)) and so we can apply the
construction in [21], so there exists a rank-1 projector-valued measure (PVM) M = {Π~ν : ~ν ∈ {a, b}
N} such
that Π~ν |~ν〉〈~ν| = 0 for all ~ν [21]. For all ~ν, Π~ν |~ν〉〈~ν| = 0 and so there exist PVMs containing Π~ν and |~ν〉〈~ν|,
for example {|~ν〉〈~ν|,Π~ν ,1− |~ν〉〈~ν| −Π~ν}. Hence
R(|~ν〉〈~ν|) ∩ T (Π~ν) = ∅ (25)
for all ~ν, since a lambda in the intersection of R(|~ν〉〈~ν| and T (Π~ν) would, in a measurement containing both
such as the one given above, have to yield the |~ν〉〈~ν| outcome with probability 1, and the Π~ν outcome with
nonzero probability, a clear contradiction. Therefore
S(µ|ψ1〉) ∩ S(µ|ψ2〉) ⊆
[
∩~ν∈{a,b}nR(|~ν〉〈~ν|)
]
∩ Λ (26)
⊆
[
∩~ν∈{a,b}nR(|~ν〉〈~ν|)
]
∩
[
∪~ν∈{a,b}nT (Π~ν)
]
(27)
⊆ ∅, (28)
giving the desired result, where the second line follows as some outcome must occur when the measurement
M is performed.
Since limN→∞ cos
2N (2 tan−1(21/2N − 1)) = 1, which can be seen by observing that the expression has
a Laurent series expansion at infinity of 1 − 1/x + O(1/x2), any two states can be shown to be ontologically
disjoint if we are equipped with a large enough Hilbert space. The result does however differ from those
of Morris [7] and of Chen and Montina [8] insofar as this dimensional constraint is present. As in the PBR
theorem [21], we need a large quantum dimension in order to be able to have a measurement that can
distinguish between states with large overlap. We note that in particular, any faithful ontological models
for an infinite dimensional space will be ψ-ontic, since no two such states can share any ontological support.
In general, any quantum system can be thought of as part of a larger quantum system, so results such as
this demonstrate an inherent tension between possibilistic measurement noncontextuality and ψ-epistemic
ontological models. Theorem 3 can also be thought of as demonstrating that the assumption of preparation
independence used by PBR can be replaced by that of faithfulness, as applied here.
We are left to consider which noncontextuality assumptions mandate the property of faithfulness for
ontological models. In particular, is it a consequence of any of the noncontextuality assumptions we have
explored? We shall see that this is dependent on the requirements one sets on an operational theory. We
shall need to introduce the formulation of probabilistic noncontextuality as it is applied to measurements.
Definition 10 (ProbOp-M) Two measurement outcomes k
(1)
M1
, belonging to a measurement procedureM1,
and k
(2)
M2
, belonging to a measurement procedure M2, in an operational model are probabilistically equivalent
(denoted k
(1)
M1
Prob
∼ k
(2)
P2
) if for all preparation procedures P,
Pr(k(1)|P,M1) = Pr(k
(2)|P,M2). (29)
Definition 11 (ProbOn-M) Two measurement effects ξM1(k1|λ), ξM2(k2|λ) in an ontological model are
probabilistically equivalent, denoted ξM1(k1|λ)
Prob
≈ ξM2(k2|λ), if and only if ξM1(k1|λ) = ξM2(k2|λ) ∀λ.
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Definition 12 (Probabilistic Noncontextuality for Measurements) For any two preparations k
(1)
M1
k
(2)
M2
related by ProbOp-M, their ontological representations ξM1(k1|λ), ξM2(k2|λ) are related by ProbOn-M.
That is, the probabilistic noncontextuality assumption states that
P1
Prob
∼ P2 ⇒ ξM1(k1|λ)
Prob
≈ ξM2(k2|λ). (30)
We see that the notion of measurement noncontextuality captures two related ideas: that any way of
performing a measurement (for example, a specific Naimark dilation for a POVM) yields to ontologically
identical predictions; and that the probabilities of specific outcomes are independent of the context in which
they appear.
Under this assumption of possibilistic measurement noncontextuality, first note that both the conditions
ξM (k|λ) = 1 and ξM (k|λ) > 0 can be recognised by considering only the possibilities of alternative outcomes.
By the definition of possibilistic noncontextuality, we then demand that these possibilities, and equally the
impossibilities, are independent of the specific context in which an observable appears. However, for a system
in a given ontic state one cannot necessarily conclude that an outcome certain in one context will be certain
in all other contexts in which it appears. The noncontextuality assumption taken at face value will only
tell us that it cannot be impossible in any other context. However, we can note that in any context in
which this outcome, E, appears, we can coarse-grain the other measurement results by “forgetting” which
of the alternative outcomes happened. These coarse-grainings yield identical probabilistic predictions, and
in a context in which E is certain, the coarse-graining is impossible. Therefore, these coarse-grainings are
impossible in all contexts, and E is certain in all contexts in which it appears.
The weakness of this argument lies in whether or not we can really consider the coarse-grainings to yield
identical probabilistic predictions with each other. If our scenario is restricted to preparing a quantum state
and then measuring it, then this assumption is justified; this is the position taken for example by Spekkens [6].
However, if we consider that a second measurement procedure could be implemented afterwards, necessitating
the existence of a state update rule, then the assumption does not hold and we must use a different notion
of noncontextuality. One such candidate would be a trichotomistic notion of noncontextuality, in which
our ontological relation, as applied to two related measurements, is that each outcome must be considered
impossible, possible-but-not-certain, or certain, independent of the context in which it appears. We can
assign these classes the symbols 0, 1/2 and 1‡. In any case, this trichotomistic notion of contextuality is also
strictly weaker than probabilistic noncontextuality and so a weaker notion is used for this proof regardless
of one’s position of the equivalence of these coarse-grainings over measurement outcomes.
4. Tests of possibilistic noncontextuality cannot be robust to experimental error
Recently, probabilistic noncontextuality inequalities have been demonstrated and subsequently shown to be
experimentally violated [22, 23]. In order to avoid finite precision loopholes, the probabilistic noncontextuality
inequalities are derived assuming probabilistic noncontextuality for both preparations and measurements.
However, as we now prove, no such inequalities can be demonstrated for possibilistic noncontextuality.
Theorem 4 Any operational prediction of quantum mechanics can be approximated arbitrarily well by an
ontological model obeying universal possibilistic noncontextuality; that is, the conjunction of possibilistic
noncontextuality for preparations and for measurements.
Proof. Let ρǫ = (1− ǫ)ρ+ ǫId/d for any fixed ǫ > 0 and any state ρ. For any two density matrices ρ and σ,
ρǫ
Poss
∼ σǫ. (31)
Therefore we can approximate all quantum mechanical predictions by operators that are all possibilistically
equivalent. The Beltrametti-Bugajski model then gives a possibilistic noncontextual model for all states as
follows. Let Λ = H and µ|ψǫ〉(|λ〉) = (1− ǫ)δ(λ− ψ) + ǫµH where µH is the uniform Haar measure. We can
‡ This concept of noncontextuality is impossible to replicate within the Abramsky-Brandenburger sheaf-theoretic framework
because these values do not form a semiring; coarse-graining two elements that are possible-but-not-certain can be either
possible-but-not-certain or certain. Any framework for contextuality based on matching probabilistic predictions in semirings
cannot express this sort of notion.
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then extend the model to general mixed states by taking convex combinations of |ψǫ〉〈ψǫ|, so that S(ρǫ) = H
for all states ρǫ. The same argument also applies to transformations and measurements.
Now, any proposed noncontextuality inequality for probabilistic noncontextuality will necessarily be
a function only of observed test statistics compared to some constant value, so we can see that for any
inequality, there exist universally possibilistically noncontextual models that differ from the quantum
statistics by an arbitrarily small value. Further, any such inequality of some use would have to be
saturated by quantum mechanics. Thus, finite experimental uncertainty makes impossible the existence
of any conclusive proof that reality is not universally possibilistically noncontextual. However, were reality
probabilistically noncontextual, there would be some amount by which the operational predictions would
have to be altered and this would be experimentally verifiable. Hence, while any particular possibilistically
noncontextual theory can be experimentally refuted, it is not possible to, for example using an analogue
of a Bell inequality, to refute the entire set of possibilistically noncontextual theories. It is worth noting
that while there are claims [24] to have an experimental verification of Hardy’s theorem, these experiments
actually verify a probabilistic version of Hardy’s paradox, enabling the existence of inequalities that are not
ǫ-closely approximated by quantum-mechanical predictions.
5. Further generalisation
In the previous sections we have developed a framework for expressing arbitrary examples of noncontextuality
relations, and explored the relationships between different forms. In this section, we will demonstrate the
power of this framework to consider novel forms of contextuality assumptions, and explore which ontological
and operational relations are sensible under certain subjective criteria. Up to this point, all of our operational
and ontological relations have been equivalence relations, although our definition of such relations does not
require transitivity. In fact, there are natural motivations for notions of noncontextuality that do not have
this property.
We could choose an operational relation identifying elements which have an operational distinguishability
of no more than ǫ: a nontransitive assumption. Likewise, we can have an ontological relation that says that
related preparation distributions should have a classical distinguishability bounded above by f(ǫ) for some
f ; enforcing a “similar elements of the theory are represented similarly in the ontological model” idea. An
idea of this kind has been explored by Winter [25].
Definition 13 (
ǫ
∼) For two preparation procedures P1 and P2, we have P1 ∼ǫ P2 ⇔ D(P1,P2) ≤ ǫ, where
D(P1,P2) is the operational distinguishability of the two preparations. Assuming quantum theory, this is
given by D(P1,P2) = |ρ1 − ρ2|1, where ρ1 and ρ2 are the density operators associated with preparations P1
and P2 respectively, and | · |1 is the trace norm.
Definition 14 (
ǫ
≈f) Two preparation distributions µ1, µ2 are related µ1 ≈ǫ µ2 if and only if∫
Λ
|µP1 − µP2 | dλ ≤ f(ǫ)
Up until now, a notion of noncontextuality has consisted of an operational relation, an ontological relation,
and a simple noncontextuality assumption saying that the former implies the latter. Here we see that we
have sets of operational and ontological relations, and our noncontextuality assumption can be thought of
as a kind of axiom schema: for any preparation procedures P1
ǫ
∼ P2, we have µP1
ǫ
≈f µP2 .
6. Concluding Remarks
We have introduced a general framework for the postulation and interpretation of noncontextuality
assumptions; we have seen that this view of a noncontextuality assumption as a statement that allows
inference of ontological properties from operational ones is both powerful in its descriptive capacity and its
ability to highlight novel assumptions.
Using this framework, we have explored weaker notions of contextuality than that of Spekkens[6], and we
have seen that one such noncontextuality assumption of this kind, possibilistic contextuality, encapsulates
the kind of contextuality present in Hardy’s proof of Bell’s theorem, and that probabilistic contextuality
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encapsulates the kind present in that of Bell. An interesting open question, then, is to ask what the
corresponding contextuality assumptions are that encapsulate Kochen-Specker contextuality, the analogue
of the kind present in the GHZ proof of Bell’s theorem [26].
For any scientific realist, the ultimate aim of scientific inquiry is to be able to make statements about
the true state of the world, as far as is possible. To be able to make any statements about the ontological
nature of the world, we need some sort of noncontextuality assumption in order to allow our operational
knowledge to transfer into this domain. Knowing, then, which noncontextuality assumptions are tenable
within a given operational scenario, and the relative strengths of these assumptions, is essential in making
any claim, however tentative, about the real nature of things.
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Appendix A.
Just as we defined the support of a preparation procedure above, we will denote the support of a measurement
effect with response function ξ(λ) as
R(ξ) := {λ ∈ Λ|ξ(λ) > 0}. (A.1)
We can also define a notion of the support of a transformation procedure as
U(Γ) := {{λ1, λ2} ∈ Λ⊗ Λ|Γ(λ2|λ1) > 0}. (A.2)
Theorem 5 Possibilistic measurement noncontextuality is equivalent to Hardy measurement noncontextu-
ality.
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Proof. Again, it is clear that possibilistic measurement noncontextuality implies Hardy measurement
noncontextuality, so we only need to prove the converse.
Quantum mechanically, POVM elements are positive semidefinite matrices, and the assumption of
possibilistic measurement noncontextuality is the identification of the ontic supports of any two such
preparation procedures whose associated density matrices share the same kernel over R2. The proof here
echoes the proof above strongly: if we have two matrices E1 and E2, that share a kernel, and correspond to
two measurement effects, we can write E1 = aE2+bE3, for E3 some matrix with a support strictly contained
within that of the other Ei. In a similar fashion to the preparations case, we can construct a POVM element
with the same matrix as E1 as a convex sum of E2 and E3, demonstrating that R(E1) = R(E2) ∪ R(E3).
We also have, by symmetry R(E2) = R(E1) ∪R(E3), and therefore R(E1) = R(E2) = R(1supp(Ei)). This
completes the proof.
The above proofs admit a slight generalisation, in that they can show that the possibilistic and probabilistic
operational relations lead to identical restrictions for any operational relation based on a function f(x) with
f(x) = f(0) iff x = 0, and f(x+ y) ≥ f(x), as defined in section 5.
We note that in this proof, we are explicitly using the same assumption that we called out in the
proof of theorem 3, namely that we are considering a coarse-graining of two measurement outcomes via
classical post-processing to be possibilistically identical to an ontological coarse graining of the relevant
POVM elements. In that section, dropping this implicit assumption weakened our axioms and required
we move to an additional noncontextuality assumption. However, for this result, dropping this assumption
makes the proof trivial because we are proving a much weaker statement. It can be easily checked that this
proof, therefore, holds in both the case in which this assumption is made or not.
Theorem 6 Possibilistic transformation noncontextuality is equivalent to Hardy transformation noncontex-
tuality.
Proof. Once again, it is clear that possibilistic transformation noncontextuality implies Hardy transformation
noncontextuality, so we only need to prove the converse.
Consider two transformation procedures Γ1 and Γ2 with the property that ∀ξ, µ,∫
Λ
dλdλ′µ(λ)Γ1(λ
′|λ)ξ(λ′) > 0⇔
∫
Λ
dλdλ′µ(λ)Γ2(λ
′|λ)ξ(λ′) > 0. (A.3)
In general, these are associated with some representations of completely positive, trace preserving maps T1
and T2. Consider their action on the state |ψ〉〈ψ|: they map it to σ1 = T1|ψ〉〈ψ|T
†
1 , and σ2 = T2|ψ〉〈ψ|T
†
2
respectively. These two matrices must share a kernel, or else we would be in contradiction with our assumed
property. An example of two maps meeting these criteria might be two dephasing channels with different
dephasing strengths.
Note that the most general kind of measurement we can perform to enact tomography on such a
transformation procedure is to prepare some entangled state, send part of the entangled state through the
transformation procedure, and then follow this up by a joint measurement. By the possibilistic notion of
noncontextuality, outcomes of such experiments must yield either a zero probability for both transformations,
or a nonzero probability for both transformations. Consider now the Choi-Jamiolkowski isomorphism as
applied to our two CPTP maps Ti, leading to two channel-states τ
(i). We can see that in general, we require
for an entangled initial state σAB and an entangled measurement EAC , that
tr
(
σABτ
(1)
BCEAC
)
> 0 ⇐⇒ tr
(
σABτ
(2)
BCEAC
)
> 0. (A.4)
Taking a trace over C for appropriately chosen EAC , viz a Bell state |Φ+〉〈Φ+| reduces this to the already-
proved case of preparation noncontextuality.
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